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Different scaling properties for the complexity of bidirectional synchronization and unidirectional
learning are essential for the security of neural cryptography. Incrementing the synaptic depth of
the networks increases the synchronization time only polynomially, but the success of the geometric
attack is reduced exponentially and it clearly fails in the limit of infinite synaptic depth. This
method is improved by adding a genetic algorithm, which selects the fittest neural networks. The
probability of a successful genetic attack is calculated for different model parameters using numerical
simulations. The results show that scaling laws observed in the case of other attacks hold for the
improved algorithm, too. The number of networks needed for an effective attack grows exponentially
with increasing synaptic depth. In addition, finite-size effects caused by Hebbian and anti-Hebbian
learning are analyzed. These learning rules converge to the random walk rule if the synaptic depth
is small compared to the square root of the system size.
PACS numbers: 84.35.+i, 87.18.Sn, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural cryptography [1, 2] is based on the effect that
two neural networks are able to synchronize by mutual
learning [3, 4]. In each step of this online learning pro-
cedure they receive a common input pattern and calcu-
late their output. Then, both neural networks use those
outputs presented by their partner to adjust their own
weights. So, they act as teacher and student simultane-
ously. Finally, this process leads to fully synchronized
weight vectors.
Synchronization of neural networks is, in fact, a com-
plex dynamical process. The weights of the networks
perform random walks, which are driven by a competi-
tion of attractive and repulsive stochastic forces [5]. Two
neural networks can increase the attractive effect of their
moves by cooperating with each other. But, a third net-
work which is only trained by the other two clearly has
a disadvantage, because it cannot skip some repulsive
steps. Therefore, bidirectional synchronization is much
faster than unidirectional learning [2].
This effect can be applied to solve a cryptographic
problem: Two partners A and B want to exchange a
secret message. A encrypts the message to protect the
content against an opponent E, who is listening to the
communication. But, B needs A’s key in order to de-
crypt the message. Therefore, the partners have to use a
cryptographic key-exchange protocol [6] in order to gen-
erate a common secret key. This can be achieved by
synchronizing two neural networks, one for A and one
for B, respectively. The attacker E trains a third neu-
ral network using inputs and outputs transmitted by the
partners as examples. But, on average, learning is slower
than synchronization. Thus, there is only a small proba-
bility PE that E is successful before A and B synchronize
[2].
While other cryptographic algorithms use complicated
calculations based on number theory [6], the neural key-
exchange protocol only needs basic mathematical oper-
ations, namely adding and subtracting integer numbers.
These can be realized efficiently in integrated circuits.
Computer scientists are already working on an hardware
implementation of neural cryptography [7, 8, 9, 10].
Since the first proposal [1] of the neural key-exchange
protocol, improved strategies for the attackers [11, 12]
and the partners [5, 13, 14] have been suggested and an-
alyzed [2, 15, 16, 17]. For the geometric attack it has been
found that the synaptic depth L determines the security
of the system: the success probability PE decreases ex-
ponentially with L, while the synchronization time tsync
increases only proportionally to L2 [17, 18]. Therefore,
any desired level of security against this attack can be
reached by increasing L.
An improved version of this method is the majority at-
tack [12]. Here a group of M neural networks estimates
the output of B’s hidden units. But, instead of updating
the weights individually, E’s tree parity machines coop-
erate and adjust the weight vectors in the same way ac-
cording to the majority vote. While using this method
increases PE , the scaling laws hold except for one spe-
cial learning rule and random inputs [12, 14]. Therefore,
neural cryptography is secure against this attack in the
limit L→∞, too.
In this paper we analyze a different method for the
opponent E. The genetic attack [11] is not based on op-
timal learning like the majority attack [12], but employs
a genetic algorithm in order to select the most successful
of E’s neural networks. First, we repeat the definition
of the neural key-exchange protocol in Sec. II. We also
explain why A and B have a clear advantage over E. The
algorithm of the genetic attack is presented in Sec. III.
Here, we show that the scaling behavior observed for the
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FIG. 1: Tree parity machine with K = 3 and N = 4.
geometric attack and the majority attack also holds for
the genetic attack. In Sec. IV we analyze the influence of
the learning rules on synchronization and learning. Fi-
nally, the known attacks on the neural key-exchange pro-
tocol are compared regarding their efficiency. The results
presented in Sec. V show that the genetic attack is less
efficient than the majority attack except for some special
cases.
II. NEURAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
In this section we repeat the definition of the neural
key-exchange protocol [1]. Each partner, A and B, uses a
tree parity machine. The structure of this neural network
is shown in Fig. 1. A tree parity machine consists of K
hidden units, which work like perceptrons. The possible
input values are binary,
xij ∈ {−1,+1} , (1)
and the weights are discrete numbers between −L and
+L,
wij ∈ {−L,−L+ 1, . . . , L− 1, L} . (2)
Here the index i = 1, . . . ,K denotes the ith hidden unit
of the tree parity machine and j = 1, . . . , N the elements
in each vector. The output of the first layer is defined as
the sign of the scalar product of inputs and weights,
σi = sgn (wi · xi) . (3)
And, the total output of the tree parity machine is given
by the product (parity) of the hidden units,
τ =
K∏
i=1
σi . (4)
At the beginning of the synchronization process A and
B initialize the weights of their neural networks ran-
domly. This initial state is kept secret. In each time step
t, K random input vectors xi are generated publicly and
the partners calculate the outputs τA and τB of their
tree parity machines. After communicating the output
bits to each other they update the weights according to
one of the following learning rules:
(i) Hebbian learning
w
+
i = wi + σixiΘ(σiτ)Θ(τ
AτB) , (5)
(ii) Anti-Hebbian learning
w
+
i = wi − σixiΘ(σiτ)Θ(τAτB) , (6)
(iii) Random walk
w
+
i = wi + xiΘ(σiτ)Θ(τ
AτB) . (7)
If any component of the weight vectors moves out of the
range −L, . . . ,+L, it is replaced by the nearest boundary
value, either −L or +L.
After some time tsync the partners have synchronized
their tree parity machines, wAi (tsync) = w
B
i (tsync), and
the process is stopped. Afterwards, A and B can use
the weight vectors as a common secret key in order to
encrypt and decrypt secret messages.
We describe the process of synchronization by standard
order parameters, which are also used for the analysis of
online learning [19]. These order parameters are
Qmi =
1
N
w
m
i ·wmi , (8)
Rm,ni =
1
N
w
m
i ·wni , (9)
where the indices m,n ∈ {A,B,E} denote A’s, B’s or
E’s tree parity machine, respectively. The level of syn-
chronization between two corresponding hidden units is
defined by the (normalized) overlap,
ρm,ni =
w
m
i ·wni√
w
m
i ·wmi
√
w
n
i ·wni
=
Rm,ni√
Qmi Q
n
i
. (10)
Uncorrelated weight vectors have ρ = 0, while the maxi-
mum value ρ = 1 is reached for full synchronization.
The overlap between two corresponding hidden units
increases if the weights of both neural networks are up-
dated in the same way. Coordinated moves, which occur
for identical σi, have an attractive effect.
Changing the weights in only one hidden unit decreases
the overlap on average. These repulsive steps can only
occur if the two output values σi are different. The prob-
ability for this event is given by the well-known general-
ization error of the perceptron, [19]
ǫi =
1
π
arccosρi , (11)
which itself is a function of the overlap ρi between the
hidden units. For an attacker who simply trains a third
tree parity machine using the examples generated by A
and B, repulsive steps occur with probability PEr = ǫi,
because E cannot influence the process of synchroniza-
tion.
In contrast, A and B communicate with each other and
are able to interact. If they disagree on the total output,
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FIG. 2: Probability Pr of repulsive steps as a function of the
generalization error ǫ. The inset shows the probability Pg for
a successful geometric correction.
there is at least one hidden unit with σAi 6= σBi . As an
update would have a repulsive effect, the partners just
do not change the weights. In doing so, A and B reduce
the probability of repulsive steps in their hidden units.
For K = 3 and identical generalization error, ǫi = ǫ, we
find [5]
PBr =
2(1− ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 ≤ ǫ = P
E
r . (12)
Therefore, the partners have a clear advantage over an
attacker using only simple learning.
But, E can use a more advanced method called geo-
metric attack. As before, she trains a third tree parity
machine, which has the same structure as A’s and B’s.
In each step τE is calculated and compared to τB. As
long as these output values are identical, E can apply the
learning rule in the same manner as B. But, if τE 6= τB ,
the attacker has to correct this deviation before updating
the weights.
For this purpose E uses the local field
hi =
1√
N
wi · xi (13)
of her hidden units as additional information. Then, the
probability of σBi 6= σEi is given by the prediction error
of the perceptron [20]
ǫi(ρi, hi) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ρi√
2(1− ρ2i )
|hi|√
Qi
)]
. (14)
If the local field hi is zero, the neural network has no in-
formation about the input vector xi, because it is perpen-
dicular to the weight vector wi. In this case the predic-
tion error reaches its global maximum of ǫi(ρi, 0) = 1/2.
The prediction error ǫi(ρi, hi) is a strictly monotonic
decreasing function of |hi|. Therefore, the attacker
searches the hidden unit with the lowest value of the
absolute local field |hEi | and flips the sign of σEi . This
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FIG. 3: Synchronization time tsync as a function of H for
K = 3, N = 1000, random walk learning rule, and different
values of L, averaged over 10 000 simulations.
results in τE = τB and the learning rule can be applied.
But, the geometric attack does not always find the cor-
rect hidden unit which caused the deviation of the total
output bits. If σEi 6= σBi in the ith hidden unit and
σEj = σ
B
j in all other hidden units, E flips the sign of σ
E
i
with probability
Pg =
∫ ∞
0
∏
j 6=i
(∫ ∞
hi
√
2π
Qj
1− ǫj(ρj , hj)
π − arccosρj e
−
h2
j
2Qj dhj
)
×
√
2π
Qi
ǫi(ρi, hi)
arccosρi
e
−
h2
i
2Qi dhi . (15)
Thus, the geometric attacker avoids some repulsive steps,
although they still occur more frequently than in the
partners’ tree parity machines.
In the case of identical generalization error ǫi = ǫ and
K = 3, we find that the probability of repulsive steps,
PEr = 2(1− Pg)(1 − ǫ)2ǫ+ 2(1− ǫ)ǫ2 +
2
3
ǫ3 , (16)
is higher than PBr , but lower than P
E
r = ǫ for simple
learning. This result is clearly visible in Fig. 2. That is
why learning by listening is slower than mutual learning,
even for advanced algorithms. This effect makes neural
cryptography feasible and prevents successful attacks in
the limit L→∞.
Recently, it has been discovered that the security of the
neural key-exchange protocol can be improved by using
queries instead of random inputs [14, 21]. The partners
ask questions to each other which depend on their own
weight vectors wi and an additional public parameter H .
In odd (even) steps A (B) generates K input vectors xi
with hAi ≈ ±H (hBi ≈ ±H). So, the absolute value of
the local field hi is given by H , while its sign σi is chosen
randomly.
Queries change the relation between the overlap and
the frequency Pr of repulsive steps. The probability of
different outputs σi in corresponding hidden units is now
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FIG. 4: Success probability PE of the genetic attack for
K = 3, N = 1000, random walk learning rule, andM = 4096.
Symbols represent results obtained from 1000 simulations,
and the lines show a fit with Eq. (17).
given by Eq. (14) instead of Eq. (11), because the ab-
solute local field in A’s or B’s hidden units is known.
Consequently, the partners can optimize complexity and
security of the neural key-exchange protocol by adjusting
H and L suitably [14].
As shown in Fig. 3, a minimum value of H is needed in
order to achieve synchronization in a reasonable number
of steps. If H > αcL, tsync increases proportional to
L2 lnN , but for H < αcL it diverges [14, 18]. In the case
of the random walk learning rule we estimate αc ≈ 0.31
by using the extrapolation method described in [14].
III. GENETIC ATTACK
For the genetic attack [11] the opponent starts with
only one tree parity machine, but she can use up to M
neural networks. As before E calculates the output of her
networks in each step. Afterwards the following genetic
algorithm is applied:
(i) If τA = τB and E has at most M/2K−1 tree parity
machines, she determines all 2K−1 internal repre-
sentations (σE1 , . . . , σ
E
K) which reproduce the out-
put τA. Then, these are used to update the weights
in E’s neural networks according to the learning
rule, so that 2K−1 variants of each tree parity ma-
chine are generated.
(ii) But, if E already has more than M/2K−1 neural
networks, the mutation step described above is not
possible. Instead of that the attacker discards all
tree parity machines which predicted less than U
outputs τA in the last V learning steps, with τA =
τB, successfully. In our simulations we use a limit
of U = 10 and a history of V = 20 as default values.
Additionally, at least 20 neural networks are kept
in such a selection step.
(iii) In the case of τA 6= τB the attacker’s networks
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FIG. 5: Parameters µ and β as a function of the synaptic
depth L. Symbols denote results of fitting simulation data
for different M with Eq. (17) and the lines were calculated
using the model given in Eq. (19).
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FIG. 6: Offset δ as a function of the number of attackers M ,
for K = 3, N = 1000, and the random walk learning rule.
Symbols and the line were obtained by a fit with Eq. (19).
remain unchanged, because A and B do not update
the weights in their tree parity machines.
The attack is considered successful if at least one of E’s
neural networks has synchronized 98% of the weights be-
fore the end of the key exchange. We use this relaxed
criterion in order to decrease the fluctuations of PE [17].
The success probability of the genetic attack strongly
depends on the value of the parameter H . This effect is
clearly visible in Fig. 4. In order to determine PE as a
function of H , a Fermi-Dirac distribution
PE =
1
1 + exp[−β(H − µ)] (17)
with two parameters β and µ can be used as a fitting
model. This equation is also valid for the geometric at-
tack and the majority attack [14].
Figure 5 shows the results of the fits using Eq. (17).
While β is nearly independent of L and M , µ increases
linearly with the synaptic depth,
µ = αsL+ δ . (18)
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FIG. 7: Success probability of the genetic attack as a function
of the synchronization time for K = 3, N = 1000, random
walk learning rule, M = 4096 and different values of L. The
dashed line shows the envelope of this set of curves.
Obviously, the attacker can change the offset δ, but not
αs, by using more resources. As shown in Fig. 6 E needs
to double M in order to decrease δ by a fixed amount
γ ln 2. Thus, µ is a linear function of both L and lnM ,
µ = αsL− γ lnM + µ0 . (19)
Substituting Eq. (19) into Eq. (17) leads to
PE =
1
1 + exp[β(µ0 − γ lnM)] exp[β(αs − α)L] (20)
for the success probability of the genetic attack as a func-
tion of α = H/L, the synaptic depth L, and the maximal
number of attackers M .
From these results we can deduce the scaling of PE
with regard to L andM . For large values of the synaptic
depth the asymptotic behavior is given by
PE ∼ e−β(µ0−γ lnM)e−β(αs−α)L (21)
as long as α < αs.
This equation shows that that the partners have a
great advantage over an attacker. If A and B increase L,
the success probability drops exponentially,
PE ∝ e−β(αs−α)L , (22)
while the complexity of the synchronization rises only
polynomially. This is clearly visible if one looks at the
function PE(〈tsync〉), which is shown in Fig. 7. Due to
the offset δ in Eq. (18) the attacker is successful for small
values of L. But, for larger synaptic depth optimal se-
curity is reached for values of H and L, which lie on
the envelope of PE(〈tsync〉). This curve is approximately
given by H = αcL, as this condition maximizes αs − α
while synchronization is still possible [14].
In contrast, the attacker has to increase the number of
her tree parity machines exponentially,
M ∝ e[(αs−α)/γ]L , (23)
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FIG. 8: Success probability of the genetic attack for K = 3,
L = 7, N = 1000, random walk learning rule, M = 4096, and
H = 2.28. These results were obtained by averaging over 100
simulations.
in order to compensate a change of L and maintain a
constant success probability PE . But, this is usually not
possible due to limited computer power.
Alternatively, the attacker could try to optimize the
other two parameters of the genetic attack. As shown
in Fig. 8, E obtains the best result if she uses U = 30,
V = 50 instead of U = 10, V = 20. Figure 5 shows that
this modification leads to a lower value of β, but does not
influence µ(L). Therefore, E gains little, as the scaling
relation (23) is not affected. That is why A and B can
easily reach an arbitrary level of security.
IV. LEARNING RULES
Beside the random walk learning rule (7) used so far,
there are two other suitable algorithms for updating the
weights: the Hebbian learning rule (5) and the anti-
Hebbian learning rule (6). The only difference between
these three rules is whether and how the output σi of
the hidden unit is included in the update step. But, this
causes some effects which we discuss in this section.
In the case of the Hebbian rule A’s and B’s tree parity
learn their own output. Therefore, the direction in which
the weight wij moves is determined by the product σixij .
But, as the output of a hidden units is a function of all
input values, there are correlations between xij and σi.
That is why the probability distribution of σixij is not
uniformly distributed in the case of random inputs, but
depends on the corresponding weight wij ,
P (σixij = 1) =
1
2

1 + erf

 wij√
NQi − w2ij



 . (24)
According to this equation, σixij = sgn(wij) occurs more
often than σixij = −sgn(wij). Thus, the Hebbian learn-
ing rule (5) pushes the weights towards the boundaries
at −L and +L.
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FIG. 9: Length of the weight vectors in the steady state for
K = 3 and N = 1000. Symbols denote results averaged over
1000 simulations and lines show the first-order approximation
given in Eq. (29) and Eq. (31).
In order to quantify this effect we calculate the sta-
tionary probability distribution of the weights. Using
Eq. (24) for the transition probabilities leads to
P (wij = w) = p0
|w|∏
m=1
1 + erf
(
m−1√
NQi−(m−1)2
)
1− erf
(
m√
NQi−m2
) , (25)
whereas the normalization constant p0 is given by
p0 =


L∑
w=−L
|w|∏
m=1
1 + erf
(
m−1√
NQi−(m−1)2
)
1− erf
(
m√
NQi−m2
)


−1
. (26)
In the limit N → ∞ the argument of the error function
vanishes and the weights are uniformly distributed. In
this case the synchronization process does not change
the initial length
√
Qi(t = 0) =
√
L(L+ 1)
3
(27)
of the weight vector.
But, for finite N the probability distribution (25) it-
self depends on the order parameter Qi. Therefore, the
expectation value of Qi is the solution of the following
equation:
Qi =
L∑
w=−L
w2P (wij = w) . (28)
By expanding Eq. (28) in terms of N−1/2 we obtain
Qi =
L(L+ 1)
3
+
8L4 + 16L3 − 10L2 − 18L+ 9
15
√
3πL(L+ 1)
1√
N
+ O
(
L4
N
)
(29)
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attack with K = 3, N = 1000, and M = 4096. The symbols
represent results from 1000 simulations and the lines show a
fit using the model given in Eq. (19).
as a first-order approximation ofQi for large system sizes.
In the case of 1 ≪ L≪ √N the asymptotic behavior of
this order parameter is given by
Qi ∼ L(L+ 1)
3
(
1 +
8
5
√
3π
L√
N
)
. (30)
Obviously, the application of the Hebbian learning rule
increases the length of the weight vectors wi until a
steady state is reached. Additionally, the changed proba-
bility distribution of the weights affects the synchroniza-
tion process and the success of attacks. That is why one
encounters finite-size effects if L/
√
N is large [17].
In the case of the anti-Hebbian rule A’s and B’s tree
parity machines learn the opposite of their own outputs.
Therefore, the weights are pulled away from the bound-
aries, so that
Qi =
L(L+ 1)
3
− 8L
4 + 16L3 − 10L2 − 18L+ 9
15
√
3πL(L+ 1)
1√
N
+ O
(
L4
N
)
(31)
∼ L(L+ 1)
3
(
1− 8
5
√
3π
L√
N
)
(32)
for 1≪ L≪ √N . Here, the length of the weight vectors
wi is decreased.
In contrast, the random walk learning rule always uses
a fixed set output. Here, the weights stay uniformly dis-
tributed, because only the random input values xij de-
termine the direction of the movements. In this case the
length of the weight vectors is given by Eq. (27).
Figure 9 shows that the theoretical predictions are in
good quantitative agreement with simulation results as
long as L2 is small compared to the system size N . The
deviations for large L are caused by higher-order terms
which are ignored in Eq. (29) and Eq. (31).
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FIG. 11: Synchronization time tsync as a function of H for
K = 3, L = 7, averaged over 100 simulations.
The choice of the learning rule affects synchronization
with random inputs as well as with queries. As the pre-
diction error (14) is a function of hi/
√
Qi, this ratio in-
stead of just the local field determines the behavior of
the system. That is why there are different values of αc
and αs for each learning rule, which is shown in Fig. 10
and Fig. 11.
In the limit N →∞, however, a system using Hebbian
or anti-Hebbian learning exhibits the same dynamics as
observed in the case of the random walk rule for all sys-
tem sizes. This is clearly visible in Fig. 11. Consequently,
one can determine the properties of neural cryptography
in the limit N →∞ without actually analyzing very large
systems. It is sufficient to use the random walk learning
rule and moderate values of N in simulations.
V. SECURITY
In order to assess the security of the neural key-
exchange protocol one has to consider all known attacks.
Therefore, we compare the efficiency of several methods
here.
Figure 12 shows that the success probability PE drops
exponentially with increasing synaptic depth L,
PE ∼ e−y(L−L0) , (33)
as long as L > L0. While this scaling behavior is the
same for all attacks, the constants y and L0 are different
for each method.
The geometric attack is the simplest method consid-
ered here. E only needs one tree parity machine, but the
success probability PE is lower than for the advanced
methods. As the exponent y is large, the two partners
can easily secure the neural key-exchange protocol by in-
creasing the synaptic depth [17].
In the case of the majority attack PE is higher, be-
cause the cooperation between E’s tree parity machines
reduces the coefficient y. A and B have to compensate
this by further stepping up L. In contrast, the genetic
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FIG. 12: Success probability PE of the geometric attack with
M = 1, the majority attack with M = 100, and the genetic
attack withM = 4096, for K = 3, N = 1000, and the random
walk learning rule. Symbols represent results averaged over
1000 simulations, in part (a) for random inputs and in part (b)
for queries withH = 0.32L. The lines were obtained by fitting
with Eq. (33).
attack increases L0, while y does not change significantly
compared to the geometric attack. Therefore, the genetic
algorithm is better only if L is not too large. Otherwise
E gains most by using the majority attack.
As shown in Fig. 12 the partners can improve the secu-
rity of the key-exchange protocol against all three attacks
by using queries. However, the majority attack remains
the most efficient of E’s methods.
We note that these results are based on numerical ex-
trapolations of the success probability PE . While ana-
lytical evidence for the complexity of a successful attack
would be desirable, it is not available yet in the case
of the nondeterministic methods with PE < 1 discussed
above. But there are only two successful deterministic
algorithms for E known at present: a brute-force attack
or a genetic attack with M = 2(K−1)tsync networks. The
complexity of these attacks clearly grows exponentially
with increasing L. Therefore, breaking the security of
neural cryptography belongs to the complexity class NP
(nondeterministic polynomial time), but we cannot prove
that it is not in P (polynomial time). This situation is
similar to that of other cryptographic protocols, e.g., the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange [6].
8VI. CONCLUSIONS
The security of cryptographic algorithms is usually
based on different scaling laws regarding the computa-
tional complexity for users and attackers. By changing
some parameter one can increase the cost of a successful
attack exponentially, while the effort for the users incre-
ments only polynomially. For conventional cryptographic
systems this parameter is the length of the key. In the
case of neural cryptography it is the synaptic depth L of
the neural networks.
As the neural key-exchange protocol uses tree parity
machines, an attacker faces the challenge to guess the in-
ternal representation of these networks correctly. Learn-
ing alone is not sufficient to solve this problem. Other-
wise the scaling laws hold and the partners can achieve
any desired level of security by increasing L.
We have analyzed an attack, which combines learn-
ing with a genetic algorithm. We have found that this
method is very successful as long as L is small. But, at-
tackers have to increase the number of their neural net-
works exponentially in order to compensate higher values
of L. That is why neural cryptography is secure against
the genetic attack as well.
This method achieves the best success probability of
all known methods only if the synaptic depth L is not
too large. For higher values of L the attacker gains more
by using the majority attack. But, both methods are
unable to break the security of the neural key-exchange
protocol in the limit L→∞.
Additionally, we have studied the influence of different
learning rules on the neural key-exchange protocol. Heb-
bian and anti-Hebbian learning change the order param-
eter Q, which is related to the length of the weight vec-
tors. If the system size N is small compared to L2, this
causes finite-size effects. But, in the limit L/
√
N → 0
the behavior of all learning rules converges to that of the
random walk rule.
Based on our results, we conclude that the neu-
ral key-exchange protocol is secure against all attacks
known up to now. But—similar to other cryptographic
algorithms—there is always a possibility that a clever
method may be found which destroys the security of neu-
ral cryptography completely.
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